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ProtectionThrough the
Price Mechanism
Inthe two preceding chapters, I surveyed and analyzed the system of quanti-
tative restrictions, and pointed out the gradual transformation of Israel's trade
policy from intervention through these restrictions to the use of the price
mechanism. In the present chapter, the forms of discriminatory intervention
through the price mechanism will be surveyed briefly, their quantitative signifi-
cance will be estimated, and the major patterns of the system will be analyzed.
I shall start with a description of the main instruments through which price
intervention was exercised—whether or not such intervention was the function
assigned to each instrument by the government.
i. METHODS OF PRICE INTERVENTION
IN IMPORTS1
The major local determinant of the price of imported goods and services (i.e.,
of the effective exchange rate for imports) was generally the formal rate of
exchange. As was mentioned earlier, a formal system of multiple exchange
rates existed for about two and one-half years, from February 1952 to the
summer of 1954. This involved-—and was intended to involve—a consider-
able degree of discrimination among various uses of foreign exch.ange, as will
be reflected later in the data.
The second most important element of price intervention was, naturally,
the tariff system. It, too, as could be expected, involved a considerable degree
of discrimination among various imported goods. As will be seen later, the
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formal rate together with the tariff always constituted, for the aggregate of
imports, the overwhelming component of the effective exchange rate. Yet for
various individual goods and services, some other forms were quite often of
quantitative significance. Since these forms are somewhat less self-explana-
tory than the formal exchange rate or the tariff, they will be mentioned here
at greater length.
Special Levies.
Unlike customs duties, special levies on imports are not enacted into
law by the Knesset (the Parliament), but by administrative decree (although
subject to approval by the Knesset's Financial Committee),. and are presumed
to be temporary. Such levies have been important mainly in two periods.
In the first, from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, levies of two kinds
were mostly intended to replace ORs. The episode of 1956, in which imports
of a few major raw materials were liberalized, was accompanied by the im-
position of special levies on these imports. Likewise, when the scrip system
(discussed in Chapter 2, section iii) was abolished, the importation of "lux-
ury" foods was allowed through the use of a so-called parallel market, in
which imports were subject to high, special levies (as well as high tariff
duties).
The second episode of significant use of import levies—on a much wider
scale—began in August 1970 and is still under way. On that date, a general
import levy of 20 per cent of the c.i.f. value of imports was imposed. This levy
was clearly considered a partial substitute for devaluation, for it was imposed
at a time when external reserves became critically low. As with other tax in-
creases which preceded it by a few months, this levy also was intended to im-
prove the country's balance-of-payments position by reducing the govern-
ment's excess demand. Although a few important categories are exempt,2
and it is applied in any case only to the importation of goods, not services,
this is a widely uniform levy, thus differing materially in nature as well as in
size from the special levies of earlier periods.
Equalization Funds and the Commercial Account.
These two instruments served to perform rather similar functions; but
the former pertained to private transactions, whereas the latter involved the
government's trading activity.
Equalization funds—for food, agriculture, and oil imports—were in-
herited from the British mandatory government. Originally, they were in-
tended to ensure that the local price of an imported good would be stable,
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paying compensation in cases of high foreign prices and appropriating the
gain in instances of below-average foreign prices. Thus, the net income of the
fund over a reasonable length of time was supposed to be approximately nil.
With time, however, the funds became more an instrument of longer-term tax-
ation or subsidization of the imports involved than a stabilizing device. This
was particularly true of fuel imports, which were, in effect, taxed through the
fuel equalization fund during the late 1 950s and early 1 960s, when a fall in
foreign prices was not accompanied by a similar change in local prices, which
remained stable. However, prices were also kept stable after the devaluation
of February 1962 as well as after the devaluation of November 1967, thus
converting the tax element in this arrangement to a subsidy. The 20 per cent
levy of August 1970 again was not reflected in the local price of the product.
Only in the spring of 1971 were local prices of fuel raised substantially, to an
extent which still fell short of the total impact of the three devaluations, i.e.,
the formal devaluations of 1962 and 1967 and the general import levy of
1970.
The Commercial Account was a bookkeeping device through which the
government's trading operations were reflected. As will be recalled, imports
of major food materials (mainly wheat, sugar, edible oil materials, and milk
products) have been handled exclusively by the government itself (through
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry). Local prices of these goods are not
necessarily equal to the foreign price multiplied by the formal rate of exchange
and are, as a rule, kept stable for long stretches of time. Surpluses and deficits
in the Commercial Account are thus created. A surplus amounts to a tax on
imports; and a deficit, to a subsidy. While the aggregate surplus or deficit in
the Commercial Account was not substantial in any given year, it reflected
on occasion rather significant, albeit offsetting surpluses and deficits in the
accounts for individual goods.
Other Subsidies.
Most import subsidies were handled through equalization funds and the
Commercial Account. The most important exception was a subsidy for "rate
differentials," which existed on a significant scale for about two years—from
August 1954 to late 1956. In August 1954, it will be recalled, the higher for-
mal rate of IL 1.80 per dollar was established for all imports. It was decided,
however, that imposition of the higher rate would be only nominal for the
imports of a few essential goods, which had been previously imported at one
of the lower rates. This was done by granting these imports special subsidies,
"rate differentials," which served to offset the higher formal rate. These sub-
sidies gradually declined until by the end of 1956 they had practically disap-
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ii. METHODS OF PRICE INTERVENTION
IN EXPORTS
Although, as will be seen later, price intervention in exports had a lower im-
pact on the economy than did the intervention in imports, in the former the
devices were more varied and their explanation less obvious. They will there-
fore be described at somewhat greater length.
Besides the formal exchange rate, there were four categories of devices
which affected export revenues: premiums on output, premiums on inputs,
subsidies for exports through import entitlement programs, and "branch
funds," which to an extent combine elements of the three other measures.3
Premiums on Output.
In one form or another, output premiums on exports have existed
throughout almost the entire period with the exception, perhaps, of the years
1962—65, when they were confined to a few individual cases.
Until 1956, export premiums were given in a largely haphazard and
varying manner. Starting in December 1949, premiums were granted on many
export goods, mostly at a rate of 10 to 12 per cent of the total value of ex-
ports. In May 1950, this was changed so that premiums were granted on value
added in exports, rather than on the total value. With the formal devaluation
of February 1952, these premiums were discontinued; some special premiums
granted from then until 1955 were usually intended to solve specific problems
involved in the process of transition from lower to higher formal rates of
exchange.4
In the period 1956—61 premium arrangements reached an apogee, and
a nearly "classic" use of this device was demonstrated. This era started in
February 1956, when a premium of IL 0.50 per dollar of value added in ex-
ports was introduced. The distinctive features of this arrangement were, first,
its widespread application: it was presumably universal and uniform, although
it excluded the two largest "traditional" export industries, citrus fruits and
polished diamonds5 (as well as exports of services); and second, its deter-
mination on the basis of value added, rather than total value. Under this plan,
an exporter would be granted a rate of IL 1 .80 per dollar (the formal rate)
plus the premium (that is, a total of IL 2.30 per dollar when the plan was in-
troduced) for the net value added in the economy, whether it was value added
by his own production or in other local firms. The import component, on the
other hand—again, whether it was inputs imported directly for his own pro-
duction (the direct component) or imports involved in inputs bought from
other local firms (the indirect import component)—would be granted only86 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
the formal rate of IL 1.80 per dollar. This was the rate at which the exporter
also bought imported inputs, after taking into account the "drawback" plan,
which freed imports for exports from import duties the indirect
import component introduced a few complications on this score). While in
principle the value added under this plan was supposedly calculated for each
individual exporter, it was, in effect, calculated only for export industries as
a whole, and was recalculated for each industry, if at all, only at long in-
tervals.
Besides the general premium plan outlined above, a few other premium
arrangements existed during the period 1956—61. Some of these were in effect
confined to specific export industries and did not amount, in the aggregate,
to any substantial sum. In addition, however, a general plan of specific pre-
mium rates for "marginal" exports went into effect in early 1959. The intent
of the plan was to raise premiums without adding a rent element by paying.
higher premiums only for increases of exports. Generally, this meant an in-
crease over the 1958 level of exports of a whole industry;6 but the committee
that determined premium rates for each industry interpreted this principle in
a variety of other ways. Most often, the "marginal" premium rate was IL 1.20
per dollar of value added, instead of the general premium rate of IL 0.85 per
dollar effective at that time, that is, there was an added premium of IL 0.35
per dollar above the general premium rate.
With the formal devaluation of February 1962, both the general pre-
mium arrangement and most of the specific ones were abolished. The most
important exceptions were premiums for exports of the textile industry, a
branch which had also enjoyed favorable treatment prior to the devaluation.
In this industry, a substantial premium, partly carried out through a "branch
fund," remained in effect. In a few other export industries, too, "branch
funds"—which will be described later—provided subsidies, although on a
smaller scale. But for the large majority of Israel's exports, premium elements
after the devaluation became nil or insignificant. This remained true for over
four years. Only in early 1966 was a premium plan reintroduced, in a manner
which has remained in force ever since.
This plan, which was established in April 1966, has been disguised by the
name "rebates of indirect taxes" but has nothing to do with those or any other
taxes. Unlike in the premium plan of 1956—61, premiums in the current one
are specified for the total rather than the added value of exports. The pre-
mium rate varies, however, according to the ratio of value added in the in-
dustry, with all industries grouped into particular classes according to average
value-added ratios: the lower the value-added ratio of the class, the lower the
premium rate granted to exports of industries in that class. It will be recalled
that under the premium-for-value-added plan of 1956—61, ratios of value
added were also ordinarily calculated for a whole industry, and usuallyMETHODS OF PRICE INTERVENTION IN EXPORTS 87
not recalculated periodically. The difference between the two plans is thus
not as radical as it may seem, and consists mainly in a reduction of the num-
ber of "classes" of industry from several hundred to just a few, thus discrim-
inating in favor of the low-value-added industry and against the high-value-
added industry within each class.
The premium rates involved in the plan were changed several times. Of
the six changes until the end of 1971, four were upward; the two downward
changes accompanied the episodes of formal devaluations in November 1967
and August 1971. The premium rates were lowered to offset part of the in-
crease in export rewards emerging from the devaluation.
The premium rates under the plan of 1956—61 and under the one oper-
ating since 1966 are presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
TABLE 4-1
Rates of Export Premiums, 1956—61
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SOURCE: Michael Michaely, Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate System (Jerusalem:
Institute, 1971; in English), Table 2-5.
a. For the citrus industry, rates refer to agricultural years (October to September).
b. From February to July 1956, IL 0.50; from then on until January 1957, IL 0.70.
Premiums on Inputs.
Most premiums in this category were relatively unimportant. The only
instance of a significant subsidy on a specific input was for fuel used in the
cement industry, where it is an important cost element. Once in a while, trans-
portation costs, either local (by train) or on international routes (by sea) were
subsidized, usually through low rate quotations by government-owned ship-
ping companies. Another instance of a transportation subsidy is the exemp-
tion of export shipments from the major part of port dues: these shipments
are charged only one-fourth of 1 per cent of the value of the shipment,
whereas import shipments are charged 2 per cent, the actual cost of producing88 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
TABLE 4-2
Rates of Export Premiums, 1966—71
(Israeli pounds per dollar of total value)
Lxport Class
Value-added ratio of export class (per cent)a 26—45 46—65 65+
Apr. 1966—Oct. 1966 .05 .08 0.11
Nov. 1966—Feb. 1967 .11 .18 0.26
Mar. 1967—Oct. 1967 .18 .26 0.36—0.45
Nov. 1967b_Jan. 1970 .10 .20 0.35
Feb. 1970—July 1970 .20 .35 0.55
Aug. 1970—Dec. 1970°
Gross .80 .90 1.05
Net .27—.41 .51—.65 0.80—1.05
Jan. 1971—July 1971°
Gross .83 .95 1.12
Net .30—.44 .56—.61 0.87—1.12
Aug. 197 ld_dateo
Gross .85 .87 0.89
Net .22—.39 .43—.58 0.60—0.89
SOURCE: Based on information from Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
a. Industries with value added of 25 per cent of total value of product or less were in
principle not entitled to export premiums. Exceptions on an ad hoc basis may, however, be
found.
b. Date of change in formal rate from IL 3.00 to IL 3.50 per dollar.
c. The net rate is exclusive of the import levy of 20 per cent imposed in August 1970, for
which exports were not entitled to a rebate under the "drawback" arrangement.
d. Date of change in formal rate to IL 4.20 per dollar.
the services for which dues are levied lying probably somewhere between the
two rates.
The only important widespread subsidy of an input was the plan for pro-
viding cheap short-term financing for exports; that is, providing a subsidy to
help defray the cost of interest on short-term capital loans.7 Facilities of one
kind or another existed during the 1950s; but a general, almost universal, plan
was established in 1962, and with only minor modifications has remained in
effect to this day. In this setup, short-term financing for industrial exports is
provided (from funds to which both the Bank of Israel and the commercial
banks contribute) under three headings: for value added; for the import com-
ponent; and for the time lag between shipment and receipt of money (that
is, short-term credits provided by the Israeli exporter to his customers).
Financing for value added is quoted in Israeli currency; whereas financing for
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charged on this credit has been mostly 6 per cent. For credit quoted in foreign
exchange, this amounted on the average to only a small subsidy, since the bor-
rower (i.e., the exporter) has to carry the risk of a devaluation. Indeed, the
extent to which exporters have availed themselves of this part of the credit
scheme has fluctuated widely in accordance with the state of expectations of
devaluation. Financing of value added, on the other hand, which is denomi-
nated in local currency, has amounted to a very substantial subsidy on the
use of capital. The charge of 6 per cent being constant, the rate of this sub-
sidization varies, of course, with changes in the market rate of interest, which
is closely associated with changes in the rate of price increases. On the aver-
age, it may be assumed that the 6 per cent rate of interest represents a subsidy
of about 10 per cent per annum of the credit used.8
The amount of credit from this source to which an exporter is entitled
depends not only, of course, on the size of his exports but also on the length
of the "production cycle," which is determined separately for each industry.
It may well be the case that production cycles are generally longer in these
calculations than is actually warranted by the production process. Moreover,
financing is provided in a lump sum for the whole length of the cycle as cal-
culated even though costs actually accumulate during the cycle rather than be-
ing all incurred at its inception. It may thus be assumed that short-term
financing from the export fund covers more than the full extent of credit actu-
ally required and probably very often by a considerable margin; the excess
credit is used, of course, in the exporter's other operations, namely, for pro-
duction for the local market. The combination of the ample size of this credit
and the highly favorable interest rate on it makes the subsidy element in-
volved in this scheme a significant factor. From 1962 to 1966, when no gen-
eral premium arrangement was in force, this was actually the main subsidiza-
tion element granted to exports, although its size was obviously much lower
than that which was provided by the direct premium schemes for output. It
has been estimated—albeit, by the use of arbitrary assumptions about interest
rate differentials—that subsidies provided through credit from export funds
amounted in 1966, for instance, to roughly 8 per cent of the effective rate of
exchange for value added (that is, about IL 0.3 per dollar) in exports of dia-
monds, and 3 per cent in other industrial exports. In later years, these rates
have risen, since (with accelerated price rises in the economy) nonsubsidized
interest rates increased. Such figures, it should be stressed, are only tentative
illustrations; but they do point out that subsidization of exports through cheap
credit facilities was of some importance during the 1960s and later as well.
Import Entitlement.
Subsidies through import entitlements were instituted in one form or an-
other starting in the late 1 940s. At first, however, they were sporadic, non-90 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
uniform, and relatively unimportant. This may be explained, perhaps, by the
predominance of exports of citrus fruit and polished diamonds, Israel's two
traditional export items in those earlier years. Since almost all the arrange-
ments of this nature confined import entitlements to inputs which were "in
the line of production" of the export industry, these two branches did not
stand to gain by such arrangements. Since these were strictly export indus-
tries, their inputs were never restricted.
With the growing importance of exports of assorted manufacturing in-
dustries, the retention-quota plans grew in significance. In May 1953, the
Pamaz° plan—the major form of the retention-quota system—was established
in its full-fledged form. In this plan, all exporters (except those of citrus fruit
and diamonds) were entitled to use all their export proceeds to buy imports
of materials in their "line of production." Partly—in proportion to the import
component in exports—these imports would be used for further production of
another "cycle" of exports.'° The other part, equivalent to the value added in
exports, would thus be left for the purchase of imported inputs for production
for the local market. Since at that time such imports were mostly restricted,
whereas prices of the finished goods in the local market were already largely
free, this import entitlement generated a quota profit. Since the imports of
each exporter were confined to his "line of production" and Pamaz rights
could not be transferred, the rates of extra profits differed, of course, from one
industry to another.'1
The Pamaz arrangement reached its peak around 1956 and then de-
clined until it disappeared in 1959. This decline was partly by design and
partly due to changing circumstances. The first factor which contributed to
diminish the importance of the system was the introduction, in 1956, of gen-
eral premiums. An exporter wishing to avail himself of the premium payment
had to sell his foreign-exchange proceeds to the Treasury, thus forgoing his
Pamaz rights. Given this alternative, many exporters opted for the premium
rather than the Pamaz right.'2 Another important influence in the same direc-
tion was the process of gradual liberalization of imports of raw materials:
obviously, Pamaz rights are of no significance when the needed inputs can be
freely imported.'3 In addition, from 1956 on, the government took a number
of measures limiting the extent of Pamaz rights.'4 At the end of 1959, the
program was abolished altogether.
Besides the general Pamaz plan, a few other import-entitlement arrange-
ments existed, mainly during the late 1950s. These "linkage" rights were
sporadic and confined to a few specific industries. Exporters in those indus-
tries would be granted an import right in a specified ratio to the size of their
exports (a ratio of one-to-one was quite common). Besides their sporadic
nature, linkage arrangements differed from the Pamaz plan in two impor-
tant aspects. First, it will be recalled that the owner of a Pamaz right had toEXCHANGE RATES AND EPRS IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 91
use part of this right to purchase imported inputs for his exports; the excess
profits from sales on the local market would be derived, therefore, only from
the value added in exports. The owner of a linkage right, on the other hand,
would finance his imported inputs by buying foreign exchange from the Treas-
ury, at the official rate, thus deriving excess profits from the total value of his
exports. Second, the user of a Pamaz right had to forgo the government's di-
rect export premium, whereas exporters who entered into a linkage agree-
ment could sell their export proceeds to the government at the premium rate,
thus enjoying both the premium and the excess profits derived from imports.
Branch Funds.
Startingin 1959, and mainly since the early 1960s, a number of so-
called branch funds were established in a form designed primarily to encour-
age exports. The number of such funds was limited to about seven or eight,
but they related to quantitatively significant export industries (mainly in tex-
tiles). During the first half of the 1 960s, before the reintroduction of general
premiums, branch funds were the main source of export subsidies, although
they were applied to only certain segments of exports. Each branch fund h.ad
its own unique structure and method of operation. In general the method of
export subsidization through the funds was a combination of governmental
premium and compensation through sales of restricted imports in the local
market. But to some extent, the funds were merely cartel arrangements,
backed by the government, which allocated sales among the local and for-
eign markets.
iii. EXCHANGE RATES AND PROTECTIVE RATES
IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
For an analysis of the effect of intervention on the economy through the
price mechanism, the various components of intervention have to be added
and transformed into estimates of effective exchange rates and effective pro-
tective rates. The most comprehensive data available for the Israeli economy
relate to effective exchange rates for imports and exports of goods. For the
aggregates, as well as for large categories, data constructed by approximately
consistent methods and definitions are available for the period from 1949
through 1971 (at this writing). Data by detailed commodity classification
have been constructed for a large part of this period, namely, for the years
1949—62. The effective-exchange-rate data for exports relate to value added
but for imports, they related to i.e., to final values of each im-
ported good.'5 Thus, while for exports these data easily yield protective rates,92 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
this is not the case for imports. Estimates of protective rates for imports are
thus much less abundant, as are also estimates of domestic resource costs
(DRCs) in various industries.
Appendix B contains a discussion of the concepts and methods in-
volved in the estimates of effective exchange rates and their relationship to
effective protective rates. The data for the aggregates of imports and of value
added in exports are presented in Table 4-3. As is explained in Appendix B,
the transformation of export rates into effective protective rates for exports is
straightforward, and will be presented shortly. On the other hand, estimates
of protective rates for import substitution cannot be derived with the same
ease. Likewise, estimates of DRCs in Israel are, unfortunately, sparse and
often not very reliable. Although the concept of "the price of value added"
(or, as it has been usually termed in Israel when applied to import substitu-
tion, "the value saved") has been in use as a policy guide in Israel as far back
as the mid-1950s, consistent, universal estimates are lacking. Usually, such
estimates were made for particular industries or firms, and most often, these
were ex-ante estimates, designed to serve as a criterion for judging the advis-
ability of undertaking a contemplated investment. The most complete set of
data on DRCs is probably that which was prepared for the deliberations of
the Public Commission in the process of the post-1962 liberalization; but, as
was mentioned in the last chapter, these data are most probably gross under-
estimates, due to the purpose for which they were intended, and cannot be
relied upon.
Direct estimates of rates of protection for import-substituting industries
are also not generally available. But from the set of data of effective exchange
rates for the final (total) value of each good, exchange rates for value added
in import substitutes may be obtained by using the effective exchange rates
for imported inputs for these industries. Such a set of data has been con-
structed. The calculations are based on detailed estimates of an 80 x 80 in-
put-output matrix of imported inputs.'6 Such a matrix is available for the
year 1958.17 On the assumption that the production structure of each industry
was close enough to that of 1958 in each of the two preceding and two follow-
ing years, the 1958 coefficients were used to construct effective-rate estimates
for the five years 1956—60. Effective exchange rates for value added in exports
and import substitutes are presented by commodity group in Table 4-4, and
their comparison is summatized in Table
Inevaluating the meaning of the import rates, and in particular in com-
paring them with export rates, it should be realized that the former suffer—
on the average, of course—from two deficiencies, both probably leading to
gross underestimation.
First, in interpreting such data, it should be recalled that the estimates
of effective exchange rates refer to price measures, but not to the QR system;EXCHANGE RATES AND EPRS IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 93
TABLE 4-3
Effective Exchange Rates for Imports and Exports of Goods, 1949—71






Rate Rate Col. I Cot. 2
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1949 0.39 0.35
1950 0.40 0.39 4.1 9.4
1951 0.39 0.41 —1.7 5.7
1952 0.81 0.81 103.8 98.3
1953 1.17 1.28 45.0 58.1
1954 1.80 1.73 54.2 35.3
1955 2.21 1.83 22.9 5.8
1956 2.26 2.05 2.3 12.1
1957 2.33 2.21 3.2 7.8
1958 2.35 2.37 0.7 7.2
1959 2.50 2.49 6.5 5.0
1960 2.57 2.58 2.5 3.6
1961 2.60 2.66 1.4 3.1
1962a 3.57 3.00 37.1 13.0
3.47 3.02
1963 3.49 3.04 0.6 0.7
1964 3.47 3.06 —0.6 0.7
1965 3.55 3.08 2.3 0.7
1966 3.59 3.27 1.1 6.1
1967 3.68 3.57 2.5 9.1
1968 4.13 4.04 11.6 13.1
1969 4.22 4.05 2.2 0.2
l970b 4.42 4.49 4.8 10.7
1971b 5.09 5.04 15.2 12.2
NOTE: Deviations of columns 3 and 4 from the corresponding percentage changes in
columns I and 2 are duetorounding of the underlying data.
SOURCE: 1949—62—Michaely, Foreign ExchangeSystem, Table4-1; 1962—71—Valery D.
Amiel, "Effective Rates of Exchange in Israel's Foreign Trade, 1962—70," Bank of Israel
EconomicReview 39(August 1972; in English), pp. 28—53.
a. Due to the shift from one source of data to another in 1962 (see Source note, above),
and slight differences between the two sources, two sets of data are presented for that year.
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TABLE 4-5
Effective Exchange Rates for Value Added in Exports and in
Import Substitutes, 1956—60: Summary Comparison




















Averageexport rate(IL per $) 2.05 2.21 2.37 2.49 2.58
Averageimport rate(IL per $) 3.26 2.91 2.63 3.16 3.47
Import rate as percentage of export rate •159 132 111 127 134
Rm =effectiveexchange rate for import substitutes.
=effectiveexchange rate for exports.
SOURCE: Table 4-4.
that is, quota profits are not measured in the calculation of effective exchange
rates. But this element exists, naturally, only with regard to protection of im-
port substitutes, and not to exports, in which protection is afforded only by
direct price elements. Thus, even were the estimates accurate and complete as
far as they are supposed to go, they would not describe the full measure of
protection afforded to imports. Hence, this measure is understated for imports
in comparisons with estimates of protection for exports.
The second deficiency is due to the technique of the estimates. In deriv-
ing these by the use of input-output data, the effective exchange rate for each
imported input was assumed—for lack of any alternative—to be the average
exchange rate estimated for this import category. Were each such category a
homogeneous product, this method would have been correct. But, in effect,
every category includes a multitude of individual goods, each with its own
effective exchange rate, with the rate for the category as a whole derived as
an average weighted by the size of imports of each individual good.1° This in
itself would not be very damaging had the distribution of individual rates
within each group of commodities been random. But, as will be seen later, and
as is well known from the experience of many countries, this was not the case:
exchange rates for raw materials or semimanufactured goods tend to be lower
than the rates for final goods, and each category of goods usually consists of
a mixture of goods at various stages of production. Thus, were the rates for
goods within each category weighted by the size of imports actually used as
inputs in domestic production, the average rate yielded would have been







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CEXCHANGE RATES AND EPRs IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 101
often, very probably, by a substantial margin. Using upwardly biased esti-
mates for the rate of exchange for imported inputs leads, of course, to a
downwardly biased estimate of the effective exchange rate for value added.
A similar (although probably less important) bias in the same direction
is due to the method of estimating average rates of exchange for the final
good in each group: the rates of individual goods within the group are
weighted by the size of exports (for the export rate) or imports (for the im-
port rate). As is well known, this procedure, as compared with a uniform-
rate one, increases the weights of exports with particularly high rates and of
imports with particularly low rates, thus raising the estimate of the value-
added rate for exports and lowering it for import substitutes.2°
The estimates of effective exchange rates for value added in exports and
in import substitution may be transformed, in the manner described in Ap-
pendix B, into estimates of effective protective rates. These are presented in
Table 4-6. Since the ranking of rates is identical, due to the method of trans-
formation used, whether effective exchange rates (for value added) are used
or effective protective rates (EPRs), the analysis of both sets of data will
yield identical conclusions. In the following discussion, the data on effective
exchange rates in Table 4-4 will be used, but the set of EPRs in Table 4-6
could be utilized just as well.
From Table 4-4, it seems that the variance of rates is much higher in
imports than in exports, both across groups and when changes within the five-
year period presented are considered. This is probably partly a result of the
crude and indirect way in which import rates were calculated. It is also prob-
ably partly due to the fact that while export rates were by and large known
to policymakers because of the subsidization methods, rates for value added
in import substitution, which contain elements of exchange rates on imported
inputs and reflect the size of the import component, were not known nearly
as well, and were not decided upon directly, thus leaving more room for
chance to play a role. At least to some extent, though, the large variance
shown in rates of exchange for value added in import substitutes must also
reflect the actual dispersion of final-value rates, as will be seen in the next
section.
From the summary presented in Table 4-5, it appears that in most groups
import (value-added) rates were lower, in all five years considered, than ex-
port rates. In view of the probably gross underestimation of import rates, it is
doubtful whether any conclusion could be based on this finding. When average
rates for total exports and imports are considered, on the other hand, the data
in the table show that the import rate always exceeds the export rate.2' In
this instance, awareness of the biases involved should, of course, serve to in-
crease confidence in the conclusion, namely, that for production inthe
economy as a whole, the protective rate in import substitution exceeded the
protective rate for exports.102 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
This inference is strongly supported by preliminary findings of a study
relating to a later year, 1965, in which protective rates were estimated by a
somewhat more refined procedure.22 Input-output coefficients were still the
main basis of the estimates; but important inputs were examined more care-
fully, to enable discretionary decisions to be made about the proper inputs
and input rates to be included. These findings are summarized in Table 4-7.
TABLE 4-7




Food, tobacco, etc. 153 1
Textiles and leather 116 ' 121
Other light industries 16 7
Chemicals and minerals 78 —9
Metal industries 64 —16
Total 66 10
SOURCE: Preliminary data provided by Joseph Baruch, "The Struc-
ture of Protection in Israel, 1965 and 1968" (Ph.D. diss. in progress,
Hebrew University).
It can be seen in the table that in two of the six major sectors—textiles
and leather and other light industries—protective rates were about equal in
import substitution and in exports. In the other four, effective protection in
import substitution was clearly and substantially higher than in exports; ef-
fective protective rates in exports even appear to be negative in two of these
four sectors, and positive only in one (in the fourth it is practically nil). For
the aggregates, the effective protection rate seems to be substantial (66 per
cent) in import substitution, and rather low (10 per cent) in exports. Exclud-
ing the textile industry, aggregate exports would appear to be subject to nega-
tive protection, although not to a high degree. This is due to the previously
noted scarcity of export premiums and other subsidies, except in the textile
industry, from the devaluation of 1962 to the end of 1966; at the same time,
the "drawback" scheme, which in principle frees exporters from import duties
on inputs for exports, does not operate perfectly; in particular, it does not
provide for refunds of duties paid on the indirect component of imports in
exports.
The textile industry has been investigated in some detail, in a study inEXCHANGE RATES AND EPRS IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 103
which both effective protective rates and domestic resource costs have been
determined for a sample of goods drawn from the various subbranches of the
industry, where the individual goods are defined in great detail.23 Rates have
been calculated separately for import substitution and for exports. The find-
ings are summarized in Table 4-8.
In comparing effective protective rates in import substitutes (column 3)
and in exports (column 6), no general rule seems to emerge.24 On the basis
of these findings, it would not be warranted to assert that import substitution
has enjoyed more protection than exports. It should be recalled, however, that
effective exchange rates and effective protective rates have persistently been
higher, by a substantial margin, for exports of the textile industry than for ex-
ports of most other industries, but no such general discrimination in favor of
the textile industry has been apparent in import substitution. Thus, even
equality of protective rates for exports and imports in the textile industry
would have suggested a generally higher rate of protection in import substitu-
tion than in exports in other industries.25
The findings of Table 4-8 may be more illuminating, however, for an-
other issue: this is apparently the only available set of data which provides
reliable estimates for both EERs (and EPRs) and DRCs for the same pre-
cisely defined, specific goods. In perfect markets and under equilibrium con-
ditions, the effective exchange rate for value added and the domestic resource
cost at the margin should be equal for each good. The existence of monopo-
lies, the imperfect mobility of factors, factor price rigidities, "water in the
tariff" (i.e., lack of effective competition from imports at the existing price),
and similar phenomena would lead to divergences between the two.26 Likewise,
the estimates of EERs do not take into account the operation of QRs or of
various other forms of governmental interference (such as subsidization of
long-term capital charges, tax concessions, and the like). Thus, in practice
the two measures could be found to diverge widely for any given good. It
would thus be interesting to compare the two in the case at hand. The esti-
mates of DRCs in Table 4-8 do not include an adjustment for possible differ-
ences between market prices (in the production of each good) and shadow
prices of factors.27 But other reasons for divergence between EERs and DRCs
should be reflected in this comparison.
Comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 4-8 shows that in import sub-
stitution EERs almost always exceed DRCs, often by a substantial margin.28
The unweighted average difference between the two is 52percent of the
DRC. On the average, however, the EERs in column 2 exceed the formal rate
of exchange by 140 per cent, compared to which the 52percent excess of
HERs over DRCs does not seem overwhelming. In exports, moreover, the
excess of EERs (column 5) over DRCs (column 4) is on average only 13
per cent, whereas the excess of EERs over the formal rate of exchange is 106104 PROTECTIONTHROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
per cent. Perhaps not less important is the comparison of rankings of the
EERs and DRCs. The rank correlation coefficient between columns 1 and 2
(import substitution) is .79; between columns 4 and 5 (exports), it is .69.
The coefficients of determination (r2) of the series in original units are .72
TABLE 4-8
Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection in the Textile Industry,
Import Substitutes Exports
DRCEER DRCEER
(IL per(IL per (IL per(IL per
$ of $ ofEPR $ of $ ofEPR
valuevalue(per valuevalue(per
added)added)cent) added)added)cent)
Product (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cotton yarn
Corded,81/1 7.4 9.9 182 13.5 10.3 194
Combed, 40/1 12.3 16.0 357 20.9 16.2 363
Cottonfabric
Semiprocessed drill 5.8 9.7 177 10.8 12.9 274
Poplin polyester 6.2 13.8 294 8.9 8.5 143
(Blended) cotton fabric
Semiprocessed drill 6.9 9.9 182
Poplin polyester 6.5 11.6 231
Combed woollen-type yarn
Pure knitting wool, 32/2 4.3 6.1 74 6.6 6.0 71
Acrylic,37/2 2.8 3.9 11 3.8 5.2 49
Acrylic,60/2 3.8 4.4 26 5.0 5.2 49
Woollen-type fabric
Polyester 3.4 6.7 91 4.7 5.6 60
Polyester (solid) 4.3 3.3 —6 6.9 6.6 89
Blended polyester 3.8 7.5 114 4.6 6.8 94
Blended polyester (solid) 4.4 6.1 74 5.4 7.3 109
Woollen trousers
Of imported fabric 5.6 5.6 60
Of domestic fabric 5.1 4.7 34
Poplin polyester shirt
Of imported fabric 3.9 4.6 31
Of domestic fabric 5.0 6.9 97
Knitted
Lambswool shirt 5.0 6.8 94
Jersey dress 4.5 4.7 34





SOURcE: Data for domestic resource costs (DRC) and effective exchange rates (EER)
from Aharon Ornstein, Haim Ben-Shahar, and Yoram Weinberger, "The Textile Industry in
Israel: Profitability, Productivity, and Policy" (in Hebrew), Rivon Le'Kalkala [Economic
quarterly], June 1970, Pp. 118—130, and September 1970, pp. 220—230, Tables 19 and 20. EERs
converted to effective protective rates (EPR) by the formula (R. —R)/R,whereis the rate
for the individual product and R =IL3.50 per dollar.
a. Exact year is not specified in the source, but may be implied from accompanying text.
for import substitution and .86 for exports. The outcome of all these measures
suggests a rather close resemblance between the series of EERs and DRCs.
The resemblance of the two sets of estimates suggests, first, that the esti-
mates of EPRs could not be wide of the mark as indicators of the degree of
protection afforded to an industry, despite the elements missing from the esti-
mates. Beyond that, the association of the two sets could be explained in two
alternative ways. It may be assumed, first, that effective exchange rates for
each activity are determined in an independent way (that is, by considera-
tions other than costs). The size of production in each activity then expands
or contracts to the point at which the cost of value added (the DRC) becomes
roughly equal to the effective exchange rate (for value added); that is, market
forces work without much hindrance. In the alternative explanation an oppo-
site adjustment would be assumed: At each point in time, the government may
be assumed to take the costs of production in each activity as given, and grant
the activity an effective exchange rate which would result in an approximate
coverage of the costs of this activity. There is no feasible way of deciding
which one of these hypotheses should be accepted. Circumstantial evidence
suggests that both explanations are plausible: the similarity of the two sets of
estimates is probably the combined outcome of both processes. It may also
be assumed that the "tailoring" of effective exchange rates to cover costs is
more prevalent in the textile industry, particularly for exports, than in most
other industries.
iv. FORMAL DEVALUATION AND THE USE
OF OTHER PRICE COMPONENTS
Except in the years 1952—54, the formal rate of exchange was uniform for al-
most all foreign-exchange transactions. Government intervention in trade via
the price mechanism was mainly through premiums and other subsidies on
exports and tariffs and levies on imports; these constitute the nonformal corn-106 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
ponents of the effective exchange rate. In order to judge the significance of
this intervention, three interrelated questions must be answered: How large
was it in terms of its average size? Was it actually a specific intervention in
the working of the mechanism or merely a substitute for the use of the formal
exchange rate, i.e., for devaluation? And was it discriminatory or applied
uniformly? The first two questions are dealt with here; the third, in the section
following.
It may be seen, from Table 4-9, that the nonformal component amounted,
at its peak in the early 1960s, to somewhat over 30 per cent of the effective
rate (that is, close to half of the formal rate), for both exports and imports.
The averages for the period as a whole were, of course, lower, but very often
quite close to this peak level. It may thus be seen, by way of a general im-
pression, that these forms of price intervention were not trivial, but rather of
considerable quantitative significance.
The data in Table 4-9, together with those of Table 4-3, may very tenta-
tively provide a clue to the extent to which nonformal components were used
as a substitute for formal devaluation. In this respect, some difference ap-
pears between exports and imports. Table 4-3 shows that annual changes in
the effective exchange rate over time were as a rule more uniform for ex-
ports than for imports. Since changes in the formal rate were mostly identical
for exports and imports, this difference must, of course, be due to the behavior
of the nonformal components. It appears indeed, from Table 4-3, that in ex-
ports this component was used, over the long run, to smooth out the process
of devaluation, at least until the latter half of the 1960s. Formal devaluations
were substantial, but between devaluations the nonformal component of the
rate kept rising. Upon formal devaluation, however, the nonformal compo-
nent would be drastically reduced, to mitigate considerably the effect of the
formal change on the effective rate of exchange. The devaluation of 1962, en-
tailing an increase of 67 per cent in the formal exchange rate, thus led to an
increase of only about 13 per cent in the effective exchange rate for exports.
In principle, this tendency was true also for the two later episodes of formal
devaluation (November 1967 and August 1971), but to a much smaller ex-
tent, probably because these devaluations were themselves mild (17 per cent
in the former and 20 per cent in the latter). By and large, it may therefore be
assumed that the nonformal component of the export rate was used as a sub-
stitute for formal devaluation: it was gradually raised between devaluations,
and reduced (or even eliminated) at times of formal devaluation. The guiding
principle for such a policy might have been the prevention of short-term rent
payments to exporters, a principle which, as will be pointed out later, served
also to a large extent to determine the pattern of differential rates among ex-
port industries.
In imports, the level of the nonformal component, as well as its fractionFORMAL DEVALUATION AND THE USE OF OTHER PRICE COMPONENTS107
TABLE 4-9
Formal and Nonformal Components of Effective Exchange Rates
in Exports and Imports, 1949-71









Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1949 0.340 0.012 0.046 3.4 11.9
1950 0.357 0.028 0.045 7.3 11.2
1951 0.357 0.050 0.038 12.3 9.6
1952 0.702 0.694 0.105 0.111 13.0 13.8
1953 1.163 0.830 0.113 0.337 8.9 28.9
1954 1.663 1.506 0.063 0.293 3.6 16.3
1955 1.800 0.027 0.411 1.5 18.6
1956 1.800 0.249 0.461 12.1 20.4
1957 1.800 0.409 0.534 18.5 22.9
1958 1.800 0.569 0.550 24.0 23.4
1959 1.80 0.69 0.70 27.6 28.1
1960 1.80 0.78 0.77 30.1 29.9
1961 1.80 0.86 0.80 32.2 30.9
1962
(Feb.—Dec.) 3.00 0 0.57 0 16.0
1963 3.00 0.04 0.49 1.3 14.0
1964 3.00 0.06 0.47 2.0 13.3
1965 3.00 0.08 0.55 2.7 15.5
1966 3.00 0.27 0.59 8.6 16.4
1967
(Jan.—Nov.) 3.00 0.57 0.68 16.0 18.5
1968 3.50 0.54 0.63 13.4 15.3
1969 3.50 0.55 0.72 13.6 17.1
1970 3.50 0.99 0.92 22.2 20.8
1971
(Jan.—Aug.) 3.50 1.29 1.24 26.9 26.0
(Sept.—Dec.) 4.20 1.03 1.38 19.8 24.7
SOURCE: For 1949—62, Michaely, Foreign Exchange System, Table 4-2; 1963—71, calcu-
lated from data in Amiel, "Effective Exchange Rate."
a. Includes premiums and other subsidies on exports and tariffs and levies on imports.
b. Column 3 divided by the sum of columns 1 and 3.
c. Column 4 divided by the sum of columns 2 and 4.108 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
of the total size of the effective rate of exchange, fluctuated much less than in
exports. Only in the episode of the devaluation of 1962 does it appear clearly
that part of the formal change of the rate was used to replace the nonformal
component—and even on this occasion the replacement is much smaller than
in the case of exports. Excluding the first few years, it appears that even at its
low points, just after formal devaluations, the nonformal component consti-
tuted about 15 per cent of the effective exchange rate for imports, whereas in
exports this component was very often nil or amounted to just a few per-
centage points. It may thus be inferred—necessarily, in a very tentative way—
that in imports the nonformal component of the rate was much less exten-
sively used than in exports as a substitute for formal changes in the rate of
exchange. If this is true, then this component must be related to the conven-
tional functions of tariffs and duties on imports, namely, raising revenue for
the government and protecting specific industries. This interpretation, in turn,
would lead one to suppose that the nonformal component was used in a
more discriminatory fashion in imports than in exports; that is, the degree
of dispersion in the effective-exchange-rate system would be higher in im-
ports than in exports. This is indeed the case, as I explain in the following
section.
v. DISCRIMINATION IN THE EXCHANGE-
RATE SYSTEM
The data used for determining whether the exchange-rate system for exports
is discriminatory are somewhat deficient. Although the direct premium ele-
ments have been estimated with reasonable accuracy, other subsidy elements,
realized through compensation in the local market and through branch funds,
are mostly missing from the estimates. Quantitatively, the most important es-
timate missing is for the subsidy element in the• Pamaz system of the mid- and
late 1950s.2° This deficiency is not serious so far as estimates for exports as
a whole, or major export categories, are concerned: Such average rates would
be only little affected by the missing magnitudes, since their total size was not
substantial. For a few individual goods, however, these elements were impor-
tant, and probably led to very high effective exchange rates. But, although in
this way extreme values were eliminated from the estimates, available frag-
mentary information about the extent of use of these subsidization forms sug-
gests that conclusions about the attributes of the rate system for exports as a
whole would not be altered significantly by this deficiency of the data.
Bearing this reservation in mind, it appears from the data on rates for
individual goods (not presented here) that the rate system was largely urii-DISCRIMINATION IN THE EXCHANGE-RATE SYSTEM 109
form: deviations of individual rates from each other, or from the average,
were quite small, seldom exceeding a range of, say, 10 to 20 per cent of the
average. This may be gathered from the fact that the main subsidization forms
—the premium programs of 1956—61 and from 1966 on—were applied in a
rather uniform way. So far as major export groupings are concerned, devia-
tions from the average—again, not very substantial—may be seen mainly in
the two traditional export categories, citrus fruit and polished diamonds, and
in textiles. Effective exchange rates for value added for these major groups
are presented in Table 4-10.
Until the mid-1950s, apparently, none of the three major export cate-
gories covered in the table was systematically discriminated against or treated
with special favor. From that time until the 1962 devaluation, diamonds re-
ceived the prevailing rate for industrial exports (IL 2.65 per dollar), exports
of citrus fruits received a lower rate, and textiles, a higher one. From the time
of the 1962 devaluation until 1965, when export premiums were as a rule
nonexistent, exports of textiles received favorable treatment. From 1966 on,
with the reintroduction of general export premiums, the favorable treatment
of textiles was reinforced, but both diamonds and citrus fruits were discrim-
inated against relative to other exports—the former more than the latter.
These two traditional exports, it may be recalled, did not (and could not, by
their nature) enjoy the benefits of the Pamaz (retention-quota) plan of the
1 950s or other of compensation through the local market. It may thus
be assumed that in comparison with other exports, these two have been dis-
criminated against during most of the period since the mid-1950s.
The special favorable rate for textiles has been part of an over-all effort
to encourage the growth of that industry, which was judged by the govern-
ment to be most suitable for the newly established towns in Israel, in the
framework of a general policy meant to encourage the dispersion of popula-
tion. The discrimination against citrus fruits and diamond exports was due,
most probably, to both demand and supply considerations. In these two in-
dustries' (and only in these two, among export categories) Israel has a signifi-
cant share of the world market. Consequently, foreign demand for Israel's
exports of goods in these two categories is probably less elastic than in others.
In the citrus industry, but not in diamonds, supply factors are also involved:
since local consumption absorbs only a minor share of the country's produc-
tion (some 20 to 25 per cent), and the gestation period of investment in
plantations is quite long, the short-term supply of exports is rather inelastic.
In the short run, then, high export premiums for citrus products would largely
constitute a rent, while their impact on the government's budget—due to the
size of these exports—would be significant. Short-term supply considerations
—and it may be suspected that the government's considerations in this area110 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
TABLE 4-10
Se'ected Effective Exchange Rates for Exports, 1949—70




Year Fruit Diamonds Textiles of Goods
1949 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.35
1950 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.39
1951 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.41
1952 0.76 0.95 0.82 0.81
1953 1.22 1.20 1.26 1.28
1954 1.80 1.47 1.80 1.73
1955 1.80 1.87 1.80 1.83
1956 1.80 2.40 2.33 2.05
1957 1.80 2.65 2.65 2.21
1958 2.05 2.65 2.66 2.37
1959 2.16 2.65 2.83 2.49
1960 2.30 2.65 2.75 2.58
1961 2.49 2.65 2.92 2.66
1962a 3.00 3.00 3.18 3.05
1963a 3.00 3.00 3.18 3.05
1964a 3.00 3.00 3.18 3.05
1965a 3.00 3.00 3.18 3.05
1966 3.11 3.00 4.44 3.27
1967 3.23 3.08 5.76 3.57
1968 3.94 3.50 5.79 4.04
1969 3.95 3.50 5.84 4.05
1970 4.27 3.79 6.18 4.49
SOURCE: For 1949—61, Michaely, Foreign ExchangeSystem; thetextile
rate is calculated as a weighted average of five industry subgroups, using
total size of exports of each subgroup for the whole period as weights. For
1962—70, Amiel, "Effective Exchange Rate."
a. The rates for 1962—65 are averages for that period.
were primarily of a short-run nature—thus were an added argument against
granting high exchange rates to the citrus industry. It may well be that the lack
of discrimination against this industry until the mid-1950s was at least partly
due to a higher supply elasticity in those years. During World War II and
again during the War of Independence, a very large fraction of the citrus
plantations was badly damaged. Some plantations could not be restored; butDISCRIMINATION IN THE EXCHANGE-RATE SYSTEM 111
in others, yields could be increased fast by investment in restoration of the
trees as well as by introduction of modern techniques. Profits could, therefore,
at that time have a substantial impact even on short-term supply.
On the import side, the degree of dispersion of the exchange-rate system
seems to be much greater. This has already been noted earlier in the discus-
sion of effective rates for value added in import substitutes. Effective rates for
final import goods, too, varied widely from each other. Detailed data on ef-
fective rates for individual imported goods (whose number changed from a
few hundred at the beginning to over a thousand in later years), which are
available for the years 1949—62, show a high degree of dispersion. This may
be verified by a few alternative measures, one of which is presented in Table
4-11.
TABLE 4-11
Coefficients of Variation of Import Exchange Rates, 1949—62
Year Coefficient Year Coefficient
1949 .383 1956 .452
1950 .161 1957 .261
1951 .142 1958 .345
1952 .315 1959 .240
1953 .468 1960 .395
1954 .285 1961 .435
1955 .306 1962 .268
SOURCE: Michaely, Foreign Exchange System, Table 4-7.
It appears from Table 4-11 that the coefficient of variation in the rate
system3° during most of the period was substantial, in some years reaching
0.4 or above.3' Other measures (such as frequency distributions or Lorenz
curves), also yield the same impression.
What gives this dispersion special significance is that the ranking of each
product in the system remained quite consistent over the years, that is, the
rates were consistently discriminatory against some goods and consistently
favorable toward others.32 It is thus reasonable to ask what were the discrim-
inatory aspects of the rate system for imports.
Chart 4-1 presents frequency distributions of the rankings (from lowest
to highest exchange rates) of 138 commodity items classified into three cate-
gories: raw materials, machinery and equipment, and finished consumer
goods. The rankings shown are averages for each item for 195 5—61Itseems112 PROTECTION THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
CHART 4-1
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Notesto Chart4-1.
SOURCE:Michael Michaely, Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate System (Jerusalem: Falk
Institute,1971; in English), Fig. VIII.
a. The ranking, proceeding from the lowest to the highest exchange rates paid by im-
porters, includes 138 commodities, of which 69 are classified as processed raw materials; 14,
as machinery and equipment; and 55, as consumer goods.
very clear that machinery and equipment goods were concentrated at the top
of the ranking order; that is, their exchange rates were lowest. Final consumer
goods, on the other hand, were just as consistently concentrated at the tail end
of the ordering, that is, their exchange rates were highest. The third category,
raw materials, seems also to tend toward the top of the ordering (lower ex-
change rates), but to be much less concentrated than the other two, that is,
the degree of variation of rates within the category is higher. Despite this
variance of raw materials, there seems to be a clear ordering of the categories:
machinery and equipment goods are imported at the lowest effective exchange
rates; raw materials follow; and final consumer goods are imported at the
highest rate.
Similar frequency distributions are not available for other years.34 How-
ever, estimates of average rates for large categories of imports classified by
economic destination are available for the whole period from 1955 to 1971.
These are shown in Table 4-12 and confirm the impression gained earlier. The
highest exchange rates are found, as a rule, for final consumer gàods, with
rates for durable goods and processed foods usually occupying the top places.
Lowest rates are found for investment goods and, in recent years, fuel: the
level of rates in this category is usually close to the formal rate of exchange
(including, since August 1970, the general 20 per cent levy on imports). The
main exception is imports of transportation equipment, trucks being subject
to high duties. Raw materials for the most part occupy a place in between,
with construction materials having considerably higher rates than other raw
materials.
To sum up: Import exchange rates showed wide variations throughout
the years. Consistently, the lowest exchange rates were accorded to invest-
ment goods, and the highest, to final consumer goods, with raw materials in
between. This pattern largely agrees with the observations made, in earlier
chapters, about quantitative restrictions. It will be recalled that the first goods
to be liberalized, whether formally or de facto, were raw materials and ma-
chinery and equipment. Only much later did the process of liberalization of
final consumer goods get under way, and imposition of high tariff duties ac-
companied the move, tariffs which, of course, influenced the effective ex-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. In this section and the next, descriptions of forms and mechanisms for the period
until 1962 are heavily drawn from Michael Michaely, Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate
System (Jerusalem: Falk Institute, 1971; in English).
2. The most important exemptions were as follows: (a) military imports were first
exempted on the assumption that levies on these would be just a "transfer from one
pocket to another" of the government. But a year later, with the formal devaluation of
August 1971, military imports, too, became subject to the 20 per cent levy. This was
done to obtain a more accurate estimate of the size of these imports and the magnitude
of defense expenditures and to encourage the substitution of locally made items for for-
eign ones by increasing the cost of the latter. The defense budget was exempt from the
income effect of the levy because an amount equal to it was allocated to the budget.
(b) Most imports of investment goods have been exempted from the levy, since they
were imported for the use of "approved" investments. The rationale of this procedure is
that these investments are carried out by foreign investors, whose capital imports are
transferred at the formal rate of exchange, and who should therefore pay no more than
this rate for their imports of investment goods. (c) Imports of major food products have
also been mostly exempted from the levy. Since the majority of such imports are handled
by the government itself, this procedure is reflected, as will be explained later in the text,
not through the loss of revenue from the levy, but through a loss (or absence of profit)
in the government's commercial account (that is, by setting lower prices on local sales
of these goods). Here, too, many prices were raised (to include, in effect, the August
1970 levy) with the formal devaluation of August 1971.
It may be mentioned that imports for exports have not been exempted from the levy,
although, as a rule, the "drawback" system (i.e., the rebate of tariff duties on the im-
port component in exports) applies to them. The reason is that simultaneously with the
imposition of the import levy, export premiums were raised so as to compensate for the
levy on the import component in exports.
3. "Premiums" is the term conventionally used in Israel for export subsidies.
4. For instance, the season for exports of citrus fruits runs from October to May.
Most exporters were benefited by the shift of the rate from IL 1.00 to IL 1.80 per dollar
in May 1953. To compensate citrus exporters for the subsidy forgone after May, they
were granted a special premium of IL 0.136 per dollar during the 1953—54 season.
5. Diamonds were, in fact, subject to the universal premium arrangement. But
mainly because of the possibility of negative reactions of other countries involved in this
industry, the premium was disguised by other schemes. Exports of citrus fruits were also
granted a premium for value added, but at a much lower rate. Gradually this rate ap-
proached the general premium rate, until the two coincided on the eve of the 1962
devaluation.
6. In all the cases involved in the actual application of the plan, no concern was
expressed about distinctions between an industry and the individual firms included in it.
This was because individual industries consisted either of a single firm—a fairly common
phenomenon at that time—or were organized under some cartel agreement.
7. Almost since its beginnings, Israel has also had a widespread arrangement for
providing long-term capital for investment at below market (or below equilibrium) in-
terest rates as well as various other subsidy devices (such as special income-tax facilities)
for aiding investment. Despite their undoubted importance, these provisions are not dis-
cussed here because they cannot be considered export subsidies. Although export inten-116 PROTECTIONTHROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
tion and capacity were among the major criteria used in judging the applicability of
these provisions for a contemplated investment, the facilities granted were not in effect
dependent on export performance; and they were not even intended to vary with the
amount or fraction of exports of the plant involved.
8. A fully free market for short-term (or long-term, for that matter) credit has
never existed in Israel. During most of the 1960s, the rate of interest was subject to a
legal ceiling of 11 per cent per annum and of 10 per cent for lending to industry and
agriculture; earlier it had been 9 per cent. A semilegal and largely free market ("third-
side lending" or "I.O.U. arbitrage") developed, however, which amounted to a very
sizable fraction of total short-term lending. Interest rates in this market were much
higher than the legal ceiling. Varying with market conditions and, of course, with the
quality of the borrower, they were mostly in the range of 15 to 25 per cent per annum.
In early 1970, the maximum-interest law was abolished, and something approxi-
mating a free credit market has existed since (excluding credit such as that from export
funds discussed here, and other subsidized lending to local industries, which still form a
substantial part of total short-term credit). Interest rates on short-term credit from the
banking system, in the three years since then, have usually ranged from 15 to 18 per
cent.
9. The term "Pamaz" is derived from the Hebrew initials for "foreign-currency
deposits." This points to the origin of the arrangement, which at first (before 1953) was
intended merely to provide the exporter with deposits of foreign exchange which were
built up from his export proceeds and were meant to free him from the bureaucratic costs
involved in requesting foreign-exchange allocations to his imported inputs.
10. When exports were not stable but increasing, the exporter would get "credits"
(in a bookkeeping sense) of foreign exchange, enabling him to finance the increased
requirements for imported inputs.
11. In fact, the exporter was not forced to buy materials according to their pro-
portions in his export production, but could concentrate his purchases as he saw fit. He
could thus buy inputs and resell them to other industries in which he could obtain high
prices for them. For instance, exporters of chocolate and sweets at one time used most
of their Pamaz rights to buy cellophane packaging paper, which was in large demand in
the local market. If each industry uses many inputs, even in very small amounts, itis
likely that each such input can be bought by many industries. This would, in turn, tend
to lower the profit differentials among industries from what they would have been if in-
puts were bought by each industry according to the weight of the inputs in production.
12. As the available data show, exporters rarely made an all-or-none decision be-
tween the alternatives. Presumably, in each industry, exporters used their Pamaz rights
to the point where, at the margin, extra profits fell to the level of premium payments,
selling all the remainder to the Treasury at the premium rate. Since the number of ex-
porting firms in each industry was usually small, thus giving some monopolistic position
to each, a considerable gap might have often existed between the marginal profit rate
(equal to the premium) and the (higher) average rate.
13. It will be recalled that very often, the process of liberalization of imports of raw
materials was accompanied by the imposition of special import levies. On a few occa-
sions, exporters using their Pamaz rights were exempted from the duty; in effect, this
exemption amounted to a subsidy for such exports.
14. For instance, exporters were required to sell part of their foreign-exchange pro-
ceeds to the Treasury, at the formal rate, as a counterpart to the value of the indirect
import component used in the production process (which otherwise could be used toNOTES 117
provideextra profits through Pamaz purchases). Pamaz rights were also often lowered
beyond this.
15. The import exchange rates presented here are for imports subjectto duty. Duty-
free imports of goods that are generally subject to duty are excluded. The latter category
consists of two groups: imported inputs for exports, which are generally duty free under
the drawback system; and imports (referred to inIsrael as subject to "conditional
exemption") that are duty free when imported by and for the use of an organization
such as, say, a hospital or nonprofit institution, which is exempted from payment of
these duties.
16. That is, for each of the 80 industrial groups, 80 separate import coefficients were
used. These refer to total(i.e.,both direct and indirect) inputs.
17. Tables for 1965 and 1968 have also been completed recently. They could not be
utilized for the purpose on hand, however, because detailed estimates of effective ex-
change rates for imports of individual commodities are not available beyond 1962.
18. Table 4-4 contains fewer than 80 commodity groups, since in about 20 groups,
there are no exports or imports.
19. The 80 groups included over a thousand individual goods.
20. Data on domestic production classified by individual commodities, which could
have served instead for weighting, are not available.
21. The weights used for these averages were identical for exports and imports:
1958 value added in each group of commodities.
22. Joseph Baruch, "The Structure of Protection in Israel, 1965 and 1968" (Ph.D.
diss. in progress, Hebrew University).
23. This study has been prepared by the Israeli Institute for Financial Research.
The main findings are contained in Aharon Ornstein, Haim Ben-Shahar, and Yoram
Weinberger, "The Textile Industry in Israel: Profitability, Productivity, and Policy" (in
Hebrew), RivonLe'Kalkala [Economicquarterly], June 1970, pp. 118—130, and Septem-
ber 1970, pp. 220—230.
24. As noted in Table 4-8, the transformation of effective exchange rates into
effective protection rates has been carried out by the use of the formal exchange rate,
rather than the equilibrium rate advocated in Appendix B. The reason is that the method
for approximating an equilibrium rate suggested in the appendix and employed in the
construction of Table 4-6 is not appropriate for 1968. In that year, effective exchange
rates for exports only slightly exceeded the formal rate except for the export of textiles,
for which the high rate may be explained by reasons other than balance-of-payments
considerations. In any case, for the purpose in hand, the comparison of protection for
exports and import substitution, it is immaterial which exchange rate is used.
25. Domestic resource costs in the textile industry appear to be universally higher in
exports than in import substitution. This, however, is an almost inevitable result. Each
of the goods listed is assumed to be homogeneous; so costs of production are assumed
to be equal whether a unit of the good is exported or used for home consumption. Value
added in exports, on the other hand, is universally lower for exports than for home con-
sumption (import substitution), since transportation costs of the final good must be
added to the former.
26. See, for instance, Anne 0. Krueger, "Evaluating Restrictionist Trade Regimes:
Theory and Measurement," Journal of Political Economy 80 (January—February 1972):
48—62.
27. The lack of such adjustment is helpful in the present context because the pur-
pose of the comparison is not selection among alternative investment projects but deter-118 PROTECTIONTHROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
mination of the relevance of EERs (and EPRs) for market developments, as the latter
are reflected in the level of costs.
28. At least some consistency in this margin should be expected on a-priori grounds:
under conditions of perfect markets, EERs should be equal to marginalDRCs,whereas
the estimates are concerned with average DRCs, which presumably are lower.
29. As is explained in Appendix B, the subsidy generated by this system was as-
sumed, in the estimates, to be equal to the level of the general export premium.
30. The coefficient is — whereis the effective rate forim-
ports of commodity i; M is the weight (=annualvalue) for imports of i; and R =
=averageeffective rate for imports.
31. To illustrate: the coefficient of variation would be around 0.33 in a system of
two rates (equally weighted) in which one rate is twice the other; it would be 0.5 when
one rate is three times the other.
32. This is demonstrated by a number of measures inMichaely,Foreign Exchange
System, pp.109—112.
33.Thisaveraging procedure is legitimate, of course, onlybecause ranks in each
year were quite similar to those of other years, as was just noted: had the rank of each
good fluctuated widely from one year to another, the average rank for the seven years
would not be of much significance.
The 138 goods shown are taken from a list of 277 items which appeared in the
arrays of all seven years. The goods selected were ones which could be clearly classified
into one of the three categories. The nature of the other goods either could not be judged
from their definitions or they could be assumed to belong to more than one category.
34. Detailed estimates of exchange rates for individual commodities have not been
carried out beyond 1962. For years prior to 1955, the number of goods for which esti-
mates of exchange rates exist for all (or most of) the period is rather small; so con-
sistency of ranking could not be examined.